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ORGANIZED COMMON SENSE:
SOME LESSONS FROM JUDGE JACK WEINSTEIN’S
UNCOMMONLY SENSIBLE APPROACH TO
EXPERT EVIDENCE
David L. Faigman*
Claire Lesikar**
Science is . . . nothing but trained and organized common sense.
—Thomas Huxley1
INTRODUCTION
Judge Jack Weinstein would likely refuse any credit—or blame—for
the landmark decision of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc.2  Yet the sensibilities of that decision echo in much of Judge
Weinstein’s judicial opinions and legal scholarship. Daubert shares
Judge Weinstein’s commonsense, practical approach to the challenges
of integrating scientific research into legal decision making.  However,
while Judge Weinstein’s intellect and knowledge of scientific methods
have permitted him to manage Daubert’s demands, it is less clear that
the average trial court judge has been as successful.  In this tribute to
Judge Weinstein, we consider Daubert’s demand that lawyers and
judges become more sophisticated consumers of science.  Unfortu-
nately, this demand has largely gone unmet.  Lawyers and judges re-
main, on average, largely innumerate, with little understanding of the
basic requirements of the scientific method.  Moreover, fundamental
challenges associated with reasoning derived from scientific research
to legal decision making have been understudied, and the translation
of research data for legal decision makers remains something of a
muddle.  Judge Weinstein’s opinions and scholarship, however, pro-
* John F. Digardi Distinguished Professor of Law, University of California Hastings College
of the Law; Codirector, UCSF/UC Hastings Consortium on Law, Science & Health Policy; Pro-
fessor, Department of Psychiatry, University of California San Francisco School of Medicine.
** J.D. Candidate, 2016, University of California, Hastings College of the Law.
1. THOMAS H. HUXLEY, On the Educational Value of the Natural History Sciences (1854), in
LAY SERMONS, ADDRESSES, AND REVIEWS 77 (1915).  An alternative and fitting version of this
quote is the following: “Science is organized common sense where many a beautiful theory was
killed by an ugly fact.”  Thomas H. Huxley, quoted in THE ULTIMATE BOOK OF QUOTATIONS
343 (Joseph M. Demakis ed., 2012).
2. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
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vide many lessons for any sensible attempt to move forward out of
this muddle.
Scientists and lawyers approach empirical questions very differ-
ently.  First, and foremost, science and the methods of science are not
part of the core set of skills lawyers obtain in law school.  Although
“law and . . .” classes have proliferated over time, virtually no law
schools require classes in research methods and statistics.3  And few
students come to law school with this skillset.  Law school remains a
good option for the straight-A, math-phobic history or English major.
Students who excel in math and science might also go to law school,
but there are a host of lucrative alternative options awaiting them.
The average law student shares Huckleberry Finn’s lament about
mathematics:
I had been to school most all the time, and could spell and read and
write just a little, and  could say the multiplication table up to six
times seven is thirty-five, and I don’t reckon I could ever get any
further than that if I was to live forever.  I don’t take no stock in
mathematics, anyway.4
Second, and more fundamentally, there is a basic disconnect be-
tween how scientists approach the empirical world and the way courts
do so.  Whereas scientists typically collect data in order to make gen-
eral statements about phenomena, these general phenomena are em-
ployed in the courtroom to make statements about individuals.  This
basic tension between the group-data orientation of science and the
individual decision making required in the courtroom is usefully
termed the G2i problem.5  This problem involves the challenges asso-
ciated with group-to-individual inference in scientific expert testi-
mony.  For example, in Daubert, research studies were offered to
3. Michael Heise, The Importance of Being Empirical, 26 PEPP. L. REV. 807, 817 (1999).
4. MARK TWAIN, THE ADVENTURES OF HUCKLEBERRY FINN 15 (Perennial Classic ed. 1965)
(1885).
5. David L. Faigman et al., Group to Individual (G2i) Inference in Scientific Expert Testimony,
81 U. CHI. L. REV. 417, 420 (2014).  We described the concept of G2i in that article as follows:
[The] gap between conventional scientific practice and ordinary trial practice involves
the challenge of reasoning from group data to decisions about individuals (an analytical
process that we designate “G2i”). . . .  [A]ll expert evidence, whether based on con-
trolled experimental research or years of experience, presents G2i issues.  Experts tes-
tify to such matters as the conditions likely to lead to false confessions, the indicia of
schizophrenia, factors that contribute to eyewitness misidentification, the cancer-caus-
ing properties of benzene, and thousands more.  These are all general—population-
based—statements about the empirical world.  They are the “G” of G2i and represent
the ordinary perspective of most research and most expertise.  However, in the court-
room, the operative questions pertain to the particular case at hand, the “i” of G2i: Did
the suspect falsely confess? Does the defendant have schizophrenia? Was the eyewit-
ness’s identification accurate? Did benzene cause the plaintiff’s leukemia?
Id; see also infra notes 113–114 and accompanying text.
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prove that Bendectin caused birth defects in some women who took it
during pregnancy to relieve extreme morning sickness.6  At trial, in
contrast, courts must determine whether a particular case is an in-
stance of the general phenomenon of interest.  Thus, in Daubert, the
operative question was whether Jason Daubert’s birth defects were
caused by his mother’s ingestion of Bendectin.  The challenges of rea-
soning from group scientific data to an individual person in cases like
Daubert appears to resemble what physicians must do in their daily
practice.  In medicine, reasoning from G2i is ordinarily accomplished
via a methodology known as “differential diagnosis.”  The conven-
tional medical understanding of this method, however, does not fully
map onto the law’s needs.  What is usually needed in court is not a
diagnosis of illness, but rather a diagnosis of what caused that illness.
Physicians, like courts, must routinely make judgments about indi-
vidual people based on general research.  Indeed, the entire “evi-
dence-based medicine” movement can be understood as an attempt to
systematize and improve G2i.7  Moreover, medical experts regularly
testify in court regarding both general research findings and their ap-
plication to individual cases.  Thus, in daily medical practice, a doctor
might recommend that a patient take an anticoagulant despite the
heightened risk of hemorrhagic stroke associated with such drugs.  In
a subsequent civil suit against the drug’s manufacturer, in which the
patient is now the plaintiff, medical experts might be asked to describe
the scientifically established association between anticoagulants and
stroke, and then to opine on whether the plaintiff’s stroke was caused
by the defendant’s anticoagulant.  While the physician’s advice to the
patient was part of ordinary medical practice and hopefully evidence-
based, the courtroom testimony about causation is not a common part
of medical training.  In effect, what is needed for the use of scientific
data in the courtroom is a theory of “evidence-based scientific
evidence.”
The basic lesson of evidence-based medicine can be found in the
essential sensibilities of the Supreme Court’s decision in Daubert.  The
Daubert Court held that Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence
requires judges to be scientific gatekeepers.8  According to the Court,
this function means that trial courts have to evaluate the validity of
the methods and principles underlying scientific expertise.9  In two
6. Daubert, 579 U.S. at 582–84.
7. For a good introduction to evidence-based medicine, see SHARON E. STRAUSS ET AL., EVI-
DENCE-BASED MEDICINE: HOW TO PRACTICE AND TEACH IT (4th ed. 2011).
8. Daubert, 579 U.S. at 597.
9. Id.
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subsequent decisions, the Court ruled that this gatekeeping function is
a principal responsibility of the trial court,10 and extended the doc-
trine to all expert evidence, not just testimony labeled “scientific.”11
Since Daubert was decided, the debate has raged as to whether courts
can manage the task.
Although Daubert employed the gatekeeping metaphor, courts had
arguably operated as “gatekeepers” under the old rule established in
Frye v. United States.12  Under Frye, courts had to determine whether
scientific evidence offered in court was generally accepted in its re-
spective field.13  Thus, the real revolution of Daubert involved the na-
ture of the inquiry at the gate, not the existence of the gate. Daubert
mandated judicial inspection of the premises of scientific opinion,
whereas Frye required merely a survey of practitioners in the relevant
field.  Judges thus needed to develop some facility with scientific
methods and, in time, begin to understand the logical structure of sci-
entific inference.  It turns out, however, that scientific inference is fun-
damentally at odds with the kinds of inference that are endemic to
decision making in the courtroom. Daubert laid bare those
differences.
The process of translating scientific knowledge for legal use re-
quires some degree of scientific literacy and an understanding of the
sum and substance of the law.  We begin Part II by considering the
issue of legal actors’ scientific literacy, and consider Daubert’s implicit
call for greater enlightenment among judges and lawyers.  This Part
considers at some length Judge Weinstein’s views on the subject—
which are not entirely in line with Daubert’s prescriptions—and his
practice, which more nearly aligns with that decision.  In Part III, we
examine one application of scientific evidence—the matter of medical
causation—and consider how confusion over terms and misapprehen-
sion of the underlying science has led to confusion.  Judge Weinstein
was an early leader in bringing a commonsense approach to the com-
plex problem of making inferences across disciplines.  Part IV pro-
poses ways to bring greater clarity to the translational challenges
presented in medical causation cases.  This Part can only begin to map
this complex issue, but gains much from the lessons of Judge Wein-
stein’s jurisprudence in this area.  Finally, in Part V, we offer conclud-
ing remarks.
10. General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 142 (1997).
11. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 138 (1999).
12. 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
13. Id.
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II. THE NEED FOR SCIENTIFIC LITERACY
In Jackson v. Pollion,14 Judge Richard Posner expressed considera-
ble chagrin over the quality of scientific literacy displayed by the dis-
trict judge, magistrate judge, and the lawyers involved in the case.15
In particular, he criticized the magistrate and district judges for reach-
ing the wrong conclusion about whether the plaintiff’s failure to re-
ceive his hypertension medications for a brief period could have
caused a serious medical condition.16  Judge Posner commented that
“[t]his lapse is worth noting because it is indicative of a widespread,
and increasingly troublesome, discomfort among lawyers and judges
confronted by a scientific or other technological issue.  ‘As a general
matter, lawyers and science don’t mix.’”17 Judge Posner continued by
noting that many of those with little proclivity toward math and sci-
ence select law as a career: “Innumerable are the lawyers who explain
that they picked law over a technical field because they have a ‘math
block’—‘law students as a group, seem peculiarly averse to math and
science.’”18
Yet, paradoxically, in Daubert, the Supreme Court adopted a test
that, at least ostensibly, requires an understanding of science.  Indeed,
Chief Justice Rehnquist famously wrote separately in Daubert to ex-
press his concern that the majority opinion seemingly calls on judges
to become “amateur scientists.”19 Daubert’s holding imposes on trial
court judges the “daunting task” of evaluating the methods and princi-
ples underlying proffered expert opinion and determining whether
they are more likely than not scientifically valid.20  In fact, the four
nonexclusive factors suggested by the Court to aid this determination
are quintessentially scientifically based—adequate testing, peer re-
view and publication, acceptable error rates, and agreement among
other scientists in the field.21  Although working scientists would em-
ploy a rather more robust set of evaluative factors, the four chosen by
14. 733 F.3d 786 (7th Cir. 2013).
15. Id. at 787.
16. Id.
17. Id. (quoting Peter Lee, Patent Law and the Two Cultures, 120 YALE L.J. 2, 4 (2010)).
18. Id. at 788 (quoting 1 DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: STAN-
DARDS, STATISTICS, AND RESEARCH METHODS, at v (student ed. 2008)).
19. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 601 (1993) (Rehnquist, C.J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part); see also David L. Faigman, Judges as “Amateur Scientists,” 86
B.U. L. REV. 1207, 1209 (2006) (“In the twenty-first century—and the sooner the better—judges
have no choice but to become amateur scientists.”).
20. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1315 (9th Cir. 1995) (“Federal judges
. . . face a far more complex and daunting task in a post-Daubert world than before.”).
21. See generally 1 DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND
SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY § 1 (2014).
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the Court would be considered fairly standard considerations by most
scientists.
A. The Meaning of Daubert
The basic outline of the requirements of the Daubert trilogy and
Rule 702 are well-known and not controversial as listed.  In the
Zyprexa litigation,22 Judge Weinstein helpfully summarized the basic
criteria as follows:
[A] gatekeeping function is conferred upon the district court by the
Rules of Evidence. Daubert, and the guidelines set forth in Rule
104(a) . . ., suggest a preliminary determination that the testimony
of experts expected to testify is or is not helpful to the trier of fact,
reliable from an evidentiary standpoint, and relevant to the issues in
the case.  The method for determining the reliability of such testi-
mony is within the discretion of the district court.  It should make a
suitable inquiry before reaching its determinations.23
The last line of this quote—that courts should make “a suitable in-
quiry”—of course permits considerable latitude.  Some courts apply a
strong form of Daubert and require a demonstrated scientific founda-
tion for scientific and technical evidence.24  Other courts employ a de-
cidedly less rigorous application of the Daubert test.25
Indeed, following the quoted paragraph above, Judge Weinstein,
taking his cue from the Second Circuit’s fairly lax standards for admis-
sibility of expert opinions, wrote as follows: “Since ‘Rule 702 embod-
ies a liberal standard of admissibility for expert opinions,’ the
assumption the court starts with is that a well-qualified expert’s testi-
mony is admissible.”26  Yet, the final sentence of the same paragraph
states that “[t]he party who presents an expert bears the burden of
22. In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 489 F. Supp. 2d 230 (E.D.N.Y. 2007).
23. Id. at 282 (citations omitted).
24. See, e.g., Miller v. Pfizer, Inc., 196 F. Supp. 2d 1062, 1072–75 (D. Kan. 2002) (finding that
the expert’s hypothesis—that the drug Zoloft induces suicidal ideation—was testable, but had
not been adequately tested); Andrew Jurs & Scott DeVito, The Stricter Standard: An Empirical
Assessment of Daubert’s Effect on Civil Defendants, 62 CATH. U. L. REV. 675, 686 (2013).
25. See, e.g., Milward v. Acuity Specialty Prods. Grp., Inc., 639 F.3d 11, 26 (1st Cir. 2011)
(reversing the trial court’s exclusion of the plaintiff’s toxicology expert and ruling that the lower
court had applied Daubert too rigorously).
26. In re Zyprexa, 489 F. Supp. 2d at 282 (citation omitted) (quoting Nimely v. City of New
York, 414 F.3d 381, 395–96 (2d Cir. 2005)).  In Falise v. American Tobacco Co., Judge Weinstein
refused to overanalyze proffered expert testimony, commenting as follows:
Too nitpicking an approach to find reasons to exclude expert testimony from distin-
guished scientists will tend to drive the best of them out of the courtroom.  The greatest
danger to the courts is not the incompetent who will testify for pay, but our failure to
encourage sound scientists to assist the law.
107 F. Supp. 2d 200, 205 (E.D.N.Y. 2000).
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proving each element necessary to the admissibility of that expert’s
testimony and report.”27
This paragraph thus juxtaposes what appear to be two contrary
principles.  The first, a mainstay of Second Circuit case law, is the as-
sertion that Rule 702 embodies a liberal standard of admissibility.
This belief that Daubert and Rule 702 were meant to produce a more
liberal standard of admissibility is not shared by all circuits or, for that
matter, the Supreme Court.  In fact, there is little in the Daubert tril-
ogy to suggest that the Court itself believed that it was adopting a
liberal rule of admissibility for expert testimony.28  Despite
throwaway lines in Daubert stating that the “basic standard of rele-
vance” in the Federal Rules “is a liberal one,”29 or the existence of
allusions to the “austere standard” inherent in the traditional Frye ap-
proach,30 the results in all three cases suggest otherwise.  It can hardly
be a coincidence that all three cases in the Daubert trilogy ultimately
ended with the exclusion of the proffered expertise and summary dis-
position on the merits.31  And in what might be considered the fourth
case in the trilogy, Weisgram v. Marley,32 the Court made plain its
view that the gatekeeping responsibility was serious and substantive.33
In Weisgram, the trial court admitted the plaintiffs’ expert testi-
mony regarding the source of a fire that destroyed their home.34  The
jury ruled in favor of the plaintiffs.35  On appeal, the Eighth Circuit
held that the trial court had erred as a matter of law in admitting the
plaintiffs’ fire experts.36  The appellate court then ruled that without
this expert evidence, the plaintiffs had insufficient proof to support
their case.37  The appellate court directed a judgment in favor of the
defendant.38  The court thus refused to give the plaintiffs a “second
bite at the apple” by remanding for further proceedings.39  The Weis-
gram Court agreed that the plaintiffs should not be given a second
27. In re Zyprexa, 489 F. Supp. 2d at 282.
28. See David L. Faigman, The Daubert Revolution and the Birth of Modernity: Managing
Scientific Evidence in the Age of Science, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 893 (2013) (reviewing the
Daubert trilogy and a fourth case, Weisgram v. Marley, 528 U.S. 440 (2000), for clues as to the
Supreme Court’s own understanding of the import of Daubert).
29. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 587 (1993).
30. Id. at 589.
31. See Faigman, supra note 28, at 925–26.
32. 528 U.S. 440 (2000).
33. Id. at 440–47.
34. Id. at 445.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Weisgram, 528 U.S. at 445.
39. Id. at 445–46.
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chance to find admissible experts.40  Justice Ginsburg, writing for the
Court, stated:
Since Daubert . . . parties relying on expert evidence have had no-
tice of the exacting standards of reliability such evidence must meet.
It is implausible to suggest, post-Daubert, that parties will initially
present less than their best expert evidence in the expectation of a
second chance should their first try fail.  We therefore find uncon-
vincing [the plaintiffs’] fears that allowing courts of appeals to direct
the entry of judgment for defendants will punish plaintiffs who
could have shored up their cases by other means had they known
their expert testimony would be found inadmissible.41
In the hands of scientifically sophisticated judges such as Judge
Weinstein, a test that provides significant latitude in application can
be a powerful mechanism to do justice.  It might allow, for instance,
leniency in civil cases when either the law is unfair or the science is not
of the highest order.  It might additionally allow for severity in crimi-
nal cases when the forensic labs are sloppy or unaccredited, or when
the experts claim more in their testimony than the science can prove.
However, in the hands of scientifically unsophisticated judges, a test
that provides significant latitude in application can lead to injustice
and the perpetuation of the status quo.  As some commentators have
observed, for example, Daubert seems to have been applied with more
bite in civil cases against plaintiffs than it has in criminal cases against
prosecutors.42  Whether this apparent phenomenon is a consequence
of judges’ ideological bent favoring prosecutorial expert evidence or
the relatively poorer Daubert challenges mounted by criminal defense
counsel has yet to be determined with any certainty by research.  It
seems clear, however, that on balance, Daubert’s gatekeeping man-
date has been carried out more rigorously in civil cases, to the disad-
vantage of plaintiffs, and less so in criminal cases, to the advantage of
prosecutors.43
40. Id. at 456.
41. Id. at 455–56 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted) (citations omitted).
42. This appears to be the general view among academic writers. See generally Elizabeth L.
DeCoux, The Admission of Unreliable Expert Testimony Offered by the Prosecution: What’s
Wrong with Daubert and How To Make It Right, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 131; Jennifer L. Groscup et
al., The Effects of Daubert on the Admissibility of Expert Testimony in State and Federal Crimi-
nal Cases, 8 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y & L. 339 (2002); Wes R. Porter, Repeating, yet Evading Re-
view: Admitting Reliable Expert Testimony in Criminal Cases Still Depends on Who Is Asking, 36
RUTGERS L. REC. 48 (2009); D. Michael Risinger, Navigating Expert Reliability: Are Criminal
Standards of Certainty Being Left on the Dock?, 64 ALB. L. REV. 99 (2000); Donald E. Shelton,
Forensic Science Evidence and Judicial Bias in Criminal Cases, JUDGES’ J., Summer 2010, at 18.
43. Of course, another explanation for the differential impact of Daubert in the civil and crim-
inal arenas is that plaintiffs are more prone to proffer bad science than prosecutors.  While there
is undoubtedly little shortage of bad science peddled by plaintiffs, much of the forensic identifi-
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B. Understanding Science
That judges have to know something about science in order to do
their jobs appears to be a first principle for Judge Weinstein.  Al-
though referring to nonjury trials, Judge Weinstein observed seven
years before Daubert that judges should “become familiar with the
scientific background by reading about the issues and discussing them
with the experts.”44  Indeed, he emphasized that “[t]he court owes an
obligation to the parties, to society, and to itself in obtaining the best
possible answers to the scientific questions before it.”45
Judge Weinstein is realistic, however, and well understands the lim-
its of judges’ knowledge of science and that they, and their juries,
might sometimes need more than the parties do, or can, provide.  In-
deed, in a variety of different contexts, Judge Weinstein wrote approv-
ingly of the value of “neutral” experts.  In a 1998 law review article,
for example, Judge Weinstein described how he had presided over a
case involving a child’s brain injuries allegedly caused by administra-
tion of the whole-cell pertussis vaccine.46  The defense made use of
highly competent and well-qualified experts, whereas the plaintiff
called a scientist that was “borderline, under Daubert, in terms of ex-
pert credentials.”47  Judge Weinstein explained that the plaintiff’s ex-
pert “had the proper degrees and had done some research, but he had
published nothing on the subject and had entered the field at the re-
quest of [the] plaintiff’s attorney.”48  The jury found for the plaintiff,
but Judge Weinstein set aside the verdict as not supported by the evi-
dence.49  He lamented this shortage of proof:  “[I]t was somewhat dis-
quieting not to be able to reach out to the scientific community to
obtain an expert who could testify as a ‘neutral authority’ in court.”50
Judge Weinstein has not hesitated to take his own advice.51  In an
opinion that perhaps best illustrates Judge Weinstein’s commitment to
cation science introduced by prosecution experts, other than DNA, has suspect scientific bases.
See National Research Council’s Publication “Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States:
A Path Forward”: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism & Homeland Sec. of the
Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 1–2 (2009).
44. Jack B. Weinstein, Improving Expert Testimony, 20 U. RICH. L. REV. 473, 494 (1986).
45. Id. at 495.
46. Jack B. Weinstein, Science, and the Challenges of Expert Testimony in the Courtroom, 77
OR. L. REV. 1005, 1009–10 (1998).
47. Id. at 1009.
48. Id.
49. Id.  He explained the verdict for the plaintiff as a consequence of the “compelling” nature
of the case, which involved a “profoundly disabled child.” Id.
50. Id.
51. See, e.g., United States v. D.M., 942 F. Supp. 2d 327, 335 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (“The authority
to appoint expert witnesses is underutilized in contemporary litigation.”).
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doing the most he could to get the science right, he appointed two
experts to assist him explore the statistical reasoning that might in-
form a sentencing decision for drug running.52  In the truly remarka-
ble opinion of United States v. Shonubi,53 Judge Weinstein set forth in
extraordinary detail a reasoning process that is “rigidly accurate in
observation, and merciless to fallacy in logic.”54  Nonetheless, the Sec-
ond Circuit disagreed and reversed one of the great exegeses in con-
temporary law and statistical inference.55
Another particularly useful idea in the 1998 article, among many
important ones, was Judge Weinstein’s suggestion of bringing experts’
testimony in the courtroom to the greater attention of those experts’
respective professional communities.56  Such a course would bring a
sort of professional peer review to expert testimony.57  He believed
that “the publication of expert testimony, or synopses of such testi-
mony, in professional journals” might bring a needed mainstream sci-
entific perspective to the courtroom.58  Judge Weinstein explained,
We have often touted the advantages of our system of public trials,
in which witnesses appear in open court.  As a practical matter,
however, there are rarely more than a few spectators in the court-
room.  Most scientists do not have time to become legal buffs, hang-
ing out at the local courthouse waiting for trials involving scientific
evidence to unfold.  Publication would be a means of bringing ex-
pert testimony to the attention of those who are in a position to
evaluate it.59
This suggestion anticipates Justice Breyer’s often-quoted statement
in Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael,60 decided one year later, in which
he explained that a primary purpose of the Daubert gatekeeping re-
52. United States v. Shonubi, 895 F. Supp. 460, 468 (E.D.N.Y. 1995), vacated, 103 F.3d 1085
(2d Cir. 1997).
53. 895 F. Supp. 460.
54. THOMAS H. HUXLEY, THE CRAYFISH: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF ZOOLOGY 2
(1880).
55. Shonubi, 103 F.3d at 1092–93.
Judge Weinstein considered this case to be “an opportunity to observe, explain, and
discuss forensic decision-making,” an opportunity he seized with his customary thor-
oughness and erudition. Though his comprehensive opinion is a valuable addition to
the legal literature on the subject of evidence in particular and judicial decision-making
in general, we conclude that he relied on evidence beyond the category of “specific
evidence” that our prior opinion ruled was required for determination of a “relevant
conduct” drug quantity for purposes of imposing a criminal sentence.
Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Shonubi, 895 F. Supp. at 464).
56. Weinstein, supra note 46, at 1011–12.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 1011.
59. Id.
60. 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
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quirement “is to make certain that an expert, whether basing testi-
mony upon professional studies or personal experience, employs in
the courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes
the practice of an expert in the relevant field.”61  Judge Weinstein’s
publication idea provides a concrete way to achieve Justice Breyer’s
injunction.  Although such an effort would have been unrealistic in
1998 as a practical matter, contemporary technology makes such an
insight feasible.62
In 1991, Judge Weinstein gave a speech at the Eighth Circuit Judi-
cial Conference, later published under the title Rule 702 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence Is Sound; It Should Not Be Amended.63  In it, as is
true of so much of his work, the reader feels the deeply layered folds
of the Judge’s thought processes.  In his writing, Judge Weinstein
walks along an intellectual path of discovery and the reader has the
distinct pleasure of accompanying him on the journey as the judge
points out important landmarks along the way.  And he is rigorously
evenhanded.  For instance, he maintains, on the one hand, that “the
vast bulk of cases in our courtrooms involve experts who testify sensi-
bly and truthfully.”64  Yet, he observes, on the other hand, that “[w]e
would not allow what modern consensus tells us is not credible.”65
Testimony that witches or ghosts exist, or that the world is flat, falls
obviously into this category.  But, Judge Weinstein states, some
“would put in this same category harm from Bendectin [or] electro-
magnetic waves of nearby power lines.”66  He then asks the pivotal
question: “What is the role of the judge?  Is it active or passive?”67
It is here that we somewhat disagree with Judge Weinstein’s stated
views68—or, at least, his views circa 1991.  His inclination is to limit
61. Id. at 152.
62. Partly on the basis of Judge Weinstein’s suggestion here, one of the authors, David L.
Faigman, has recently cofounded a company and website dedicated to the idea of bringing pro-
fessional peer review to expert testimony. See JURILYTICS, http://www.jurilytics.com/, last visited
Mar. 27, 2015.
63. Jack B. Weinstein, Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence Is Sound; It Should Not Be
Amended, 138 F.R.D. 631 (1991) [hereinafter Weinstein Speech].
64. Id. at 638.
65. Id. at 632.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. We hasten to add that one of Judge Weinstein’s most admirable characteristics is that he
does not expect that everyone will agree with him.  Indeed, in noting that his views in his speech
did not align with several illustrious members of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, Judge
Weinstein observed that “[w]e are dealing here with judgments about how the United States
adversarial system should operate in view of its history and such fundamental constitutional
controls as the right to a jury trial.  As to these matters, reasonable members of the legal profes-
sion will differ in good faith.” Id. at 634.
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judicial management of experts and rely instead “primarily upon law-
yer-adversaries and sensible triers of fact to evaluate conflicts.”69  Our
disagreement, as discussed in the next section, is more a matter of
degree than kind.  Indeed, it might be said to be a difference of em-
phasis, or of presumptive burdens of proof, than any disagreement we
might have with his analysis of the issue of expert testimony.
C. The Need for Daubert
As the title of his speech at the Eighth Circuit Judicial Conference
indicates, Judge Weinstein was considering the wisdom of a proposed
amendment to Rule 702.70  Of historical note, although that amend-
ment was never adopted, the Daubert Court essentially adopted its
key provisions as within the meaning of the then-existing Rule 702.71
In particular, the proposed rule would have added a “reliability” re-
quirement, which was seemingly absent from the existing Rule 702.  In
Daubert, of course, the Court found reliability to be a central feature
of Rule 702, finding that the rule’s “overarching subject is the scien-
tific validity—and thus the evidentiary relevance and reliability—of
the principles that underlie a proposed submission.”72
69. Weinstein Speech, supra note 63, at 631.
70. Id.  In 1991, the proposed amendment to Rule 702 read as follows:
If the court finds [1] (1) that reliable [2] scientific, technical, or other specialized infor-
mation will substantially [3] assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to
determine a fact in issue; and (2) that a witness is qualified [4] as an expert by knowl-
edge, skill, experience, training, or education to provide such assistance, [5] it may per-
mit [6] the witness to testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. Except with
leave of court for good cause cause shown, the witness shall not testify on direct exami-
nation in any civil action to any opinion or inference or reason or basis therefore, that
has not been seasonably disclosed as required under the proposed amendments to
Rules 26(a)(2) and 26(e)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Id. at 636 (new text underlined).
71. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592–95 (1993).  The further irony is
that the Daubert Court expressly stated that “[w]e interpret the legislatively enacted Federal
Rules of Evidence as we would any statute.” Id. at 587.  Yet, the Court essentially adopted the
provisions of the proposed amendment and, moreover, Rule 702 was amended in 2000 to reflect
the Court’s decisions in Daubert and its progeny, General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136
(1997), and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999). FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory
committee’s note.  The current version of Rule 702 provides as follows:
A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if:
(a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier
of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue;
(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;
(c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and
(d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case.
FED. R. EVID. 702.
72. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594–95.
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In 1991, Judge Weinstein doubted the wisdom of extending the trial
court’s responsibilities to evaluating reliability.  He observed that
“[t]he word ‘reliable’ emphasizes that the court must decide initially
on reliability, greatly expanding the judicial role of today where the
primary issue is whether a reasonable jury could find the testimony
helpful and reliable.”73  Mostly, however, Judge Weinstein appeared
to be concerned with the overformalization of the admissibility re-
quirements, which he read the proposed amendment to do.  He pre-
ferred a set of general nonbinding protocols that would produce
“improvement in dealing with expert testimony without a change in
Rule 702.”74  It is worth quoting this list at length, which is directed at
changes courts could institute:
A. Systemic Changes
1. Changes in rules dealing with pretrial conferences, easier dis-
covery, etc.
2. Training of judges and others . . . .
B. Changes in Judicial Practice Under Existing Rules.
1. Required exchange of data and expert reports well in advance
of trial.
2. Meetings in advance of trial of opposing experts to agree on
data bases and statistical analysis; advance meeting by the court
with experts before trial to narrow disputed scientific issues and to
limit the number of experts; limiting the testimony of experts to spe-
cific issues.
3. Notice of treatises and reports and assumptions on which the
expert will testify.
4. Use of expert panels to mediate the differences among experts
and to limit their areas of dispute.
5. Selection of jurors with backgrounds adequate to the task of
evaluating complex evidence.
6. Detailed instructions by the judge during trial and at its end;
use of intermediate summations; use of notes and notebooks by ju-
ries; sending copies of experts’ reports to juries; encouraging use of
general education witnesses for the judge before trial and for juries
during trial without cross-examination or with colloquy among ex-
perts, counsel and the judge; use of Rule 706 experts and panels.
7. Sanctions for abuse by experts including exclusion from future
trials of experts who improperly exploit their role, contempt and
referral to a certifying agency or professional society; exclusion of
experts or parts of their testimony.
8. Questions and clarifying comments by the judge during trial;
tight reins by judges on experts who make speeches on cross-exami-
nation; joint testimony of opposing experts; voir dire by opponents
73. Weinstein Speech, supra note 63, at 636.
74. Id. at 639.
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and judge before trial or at least before testimony; limiting and de-
fining issues; and so on.75
Two observations might be offered regarding these proposed rec-
ommendations.  First, to the extent that some of them have been
broadly implemented since 1991, these reforms are most likely attrib-
utable to Daubert’s enlistment of the “reliability” requirements as piv-
otal to the operation of Rule 702.  Expanded discovery, pretrial
hearings, judicial education, and increased focus on the substance of
expert testimony are all largely attributable to the revolution in per-
spective wrought by Daubert.  Second, to the extent that courts have
failed to implement certain changes in practice, such as increased use
of court-appointed scientific panels or greater judicial management of
expert witnesses, they have failed to realize the promise of Daubert.
What seems abundantly clear is that Judge Weinstein was far ahead of
the curve on the reforms Daubert brought about and, indeed, is far
ahead on the reforms yet to be adopted by the vast majority of federal
courts.
Of course, any blanket statements about the scientific illiteracy of
the legal profession are inevitably overly broad and many exceptions
might be found, with Judge Weinstein being an exemplary instance.
Nonetheless, the general state of affairs with regard to the law’s un-
derstanding of the methods of science creates substantial obstacles to
the coherent use of empirical knowledge gleaned from complex re-
search studies.  Ultimately, any effective translation of scientific
knowledge for legal use requires a sophisticated understanding of
both methods and principles underlying that knowledge and the uses
to which it will be put in legal disputes.  The challenges of translating
science for legal use arise across the entire law and science frontier.
In the next Part, we consider a particularly telling example of these
challenges: the issue of reasoning from general research data in
medicine to the issue of causation in an individual legal case.
III. THE ETYMOLOGY OF DIFFERENTIAL ETIOLOGY
The basic orientation of scientists is to study the empirical world in
order to generalize about phenomena of interest.  Hence, scientists
might research the parts of the brain associated with lying, or identify
factors that interfere with eyewitness identification, or examine the
toxic effects of benzene.  In contrast, the basic orientation of partici-
pants in the courtroom is to determine whether a particular case is an
instance of some general phenomenon.  Therefore, courts might have
75. Id. at 639–40.
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to resolve whether the defendant’s brain images indicate lying, or that
an eyewitness’ identification was inaccurate, or that the plaintiff’s leu-
kemia was caused by exposure to benzene.  Inherent at the intersec-
tion of science and law lies the basic challenge that science begins—
and often ends—with general probabilistic statements about phenom-
ena, whereas courts need to make categorical judgments respecting
whether a particular case is an instance of some phenomenon.  This is
the problem of reasoning from group data to individual cases, or
G2i.76
A. Reasoning from Group Data to Individual Decisions (G2i)
The G2i problem is not specific to the courtroom.  Indeed, it is an
aspect of all applied science.  Thus, clinical medicine, in particular
when it is evidence-based, is a form of G2i.  For example, if someone
arrives at the emergency department of a hospital with chest pains,
doctors will need to determine whether she is suffering from acute
coronary ischemia or nonischemic chest pain.77  This determination is
essential for treatment.  For example, the former benefits from hospi-
talization, but the latter does not.78  In general, this process of identi-
fying the patient’s condition or illness is known as differential
diagnosis.79  The basic idea is to identify all of the possible alterna-
tives, ruling out as many as possible, with the objective of identifying
the one true condition or illness.80
Many other areas of applied science, of course, operate similarly,
including such widely varying domains as meteorology, ecology, geo-
physics, psychology, and psychiatry.  In each of these domains, re-
search informs such general phenomena as hurricanes, extinctions,
76. Faigman et al., supra note 5, at 420.
77. THOMAS B. NEWMAN & MICHAEL A. KOHN, EVIDENCE-BASED DIAGNOSIS 3 (2009).
78. Id.
79. Id. “Ischemia” is a condition that involves “a decreased supply of oxygenated blood to a
body part.” MOSBY’S DICTIONARY OF MEDICINE, NURSING & HEALTH PROFESSIONS 965 (9th
ed. 2013).  A heart attack occurs when the flow oxygenated blood to the heart is blocked.  A
heart attack can be fatal and requires immediate hospitalization. Heart Attack: Definition,
MAYO CLINIC (Nov. 15, 2014), http://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/heart-attack/
basics/definition/con-20019520.  “Nonischemic chest pain” is a category which encompasses any
chest pain that is not caused by the obstruction of oxygenated blood to the heart, and thus may
not require hospitalization. See JOYCE E. DAINS ET AL., ADVANCED HEALTH ASSESSMENT AND
CLINICAL DIAGNOSIS IN PRIMARY CARE 81 (4th ed. 2012) (“A significant proportion of patients
whose presenting symptoms include acute chest pain have esophageal spasm or gas-
troesophageal reflux disease (GERD); however, harmless conditions can mimic more serious
disease.”).
80. See generally MOSBY’S DICTIONARY OF MEDICINE, NURSING & HEALTH PROFESSIONS,
supra note 79, at 533 (“Differential diagnosis” is defined as “the distinguishing between two or
more diseases with similar symptoms by systematically comparing their signs and symptoms.”).
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earthquakes, acts of domestic violence, and mental illnesses.  And for
all of these phenomena, determining individual instances might be
highly relevant to a legal or policy decision, such as evacuating a
coastal community ahead of a hurricane, protecting an endangered
species from extinction, warning a region about a seismic event, pro-
tecting children from pedophiles, or civilly committing dangerous indi-
viduals.  The G2i challenge is thus endemic to the enterprise of
applied science and is present in any domain that relies on general
data to make decisions in individual cases.
However, the G2i problem sometimes manifests quite differently
when it is applied across disciplines.  For instance, in many—but cer-
tainly not all—medical contexts, G2i is a matter of differential diagno-
sis, not etiology.  The operative question for a doctor is often what is
the plaintiff’s condition (e.g., ischemic or nonischemic), not what
caused it.81  Many other applied disciplines also operate by identifying
conditions or correlates without knowing etiology.  Predictions re-
garding a defendant’s likelihood of violence might depend on knowl-
edge of the person’s past offenses, her drug addiction, marital status,
and other factors, without any model regarding the mechanics of how
these variables relate to the increased risk of violence.82  Similarly,
psychiatrists might be able to diagnose and treat a person as schizo-
phrenic without knowing the illness’ cause or even its biological
mechanism.
The G2i problem in the law turns out to be highly diverse and, in
many contexts, a moving target.  In regard to the diagnosis versus eti-
ology issue, the law sometimes makes relevant one and sometimes the
other.  In civil litigation, etiology is usually the operative question in
cases such as products liability, toxic torts, and medical malpractice.83
In most of these sorts of cases, the substantive law requires proof of
81. NEWMAN & KOHN, supra note 77, at 2 (“[E]ntities with different etiologies or different
pathologies may have the same treatment.  If the goal is to make decisions about treatment, the
etiology or pathology may be irrelevant.”).
82. See Helena Chmura Kraemer et al., Coming to Terms with the Terms of Risk, 54
ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 337 (1997).  To call a variable a risk factor does not imply that its
relationship to the outcome is “causal.”
83. See, e.g., In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 782 (E.D.N.Y. 1984)
(“The critical problem for the plaintiffs to establish is that the relatively small quantities of di-
oxin to which servicepersons were exposed in Vietnam caused their present disabilities.”); In re
Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., Nos. 04-MD-1596, 06-CV-1729, 2007 WL 1580083, at *1 (E.D.N.Y.
May 30, 2007) (severing a plaintiff’s causation claim from otherwise consolidated cases for trial
to avoid confusing the jury); Falise v. Am. Tobacco Co., 258 F. Supp. 2d 63, 65 (E.D.N.Y. 2000)
(“The trial court is not called upon to analyze in great detail the proposed testimony of an expert
as part of the Daubert hearing—although at times it may be useful to do so as in connection with
problems of proving general causation in the first cases on the subject of harm caused by a
pharmaceutical product.”).
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causation.  Conversely, in some civil cases, especially those that are
quasi-criminal, as well as in most criminal contexts, diagnosis rather
than causation is the legally relevant issue.  Legal relevance in these
cases—which typically concern concepts such as mental illness or ab-
normality, likelihood of violence, or intellectual disability—does not
depend on etiology.  For example, a capital defendant who is found to
be “intellectually disabled” is exempt from the death penalty,
whatever the original cause of that condition.84
In summary, then, the concept of G2i is endemic in the enterprise of
applied science and is inevitably present when science is applied in the
courtroom.  In many medical and psychiatric contexts, for example,
the reasoning process of G2i serves treatment purposes, and knowl-
edge of etiology may not be necessary or possible.  Knowing, for in-
stance, what caused the patient’s lung cancer is not necessary for
treatment.  In other medical contexts, however, knowledge of causa-
tion might be essential to treatment and, moreover, within the profes-
sion’s ability to determine.  Allergists, for example, attempt to identify
the etiology of allergic reactions in order to treat them (or to advise
the patient to avoid what caused them), though it might still be possi-
ble to treat the allergic reactions without knowing their etiology.  Sim-
ilarly, the law sometimes calls for proof of etiology and sometimes it
does not.  Very often, proving etiology is not necessary, because
merely being diagnosed with a condition might be legally relevant.
Under many civil commitment statutes, the State must prove that the
defendant is “mentally ill.”85  A diagnosis of schizophrenia in such a
case is sufficient to meet this requirement, and there is no expectation
that the cause of the schizophrenia must be determined or is otherwise
84. Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1988 (2014).  It is worth noting, however, that the diagno-
sis requires that the condition manifest prior to the age of eighteen. Id.  So, at least under
current Supreme Court precedent, someone who becomes intellectually disabled after the age of
eighteen—by accident or disease—is not per se exempt, though she might have both an Eighth
Amendment and an Equal Protection claim for such a result. See id. at 2003.
85. See Francis S. v. Stone, 221 F.3d 100, 101–02 (2d Cir. 2000) (“New York statutes, like those
of other states, distinguish between the procedures to be followed for the involuntary civil com-
mitment of persons suffering from mental illness and the procedures that apply to persons
charged with a crime and determined, by a plea or a verdict, to be ‘not responsible by reason of
mental disease or defect.’”). See generally Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 78 (1992)
(“[K]eeping [the defendant] against his will in a mental institution is improper absent a determi-
nation in civil commitment proceedings of current mental illness and dangerousness.”). But see
Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 359 (1997) (“Contrary to [the defendant’s] assertion, the term
‘mental illness’ is devoid of any talismanic significance. Not only do ‘psychiatrists disagree widely
and frequently on what constitutes mental illness,’ but the Court itself has used a variety of
expressions to describe the mental condition of those properly subject to civil confinement.”)
(quoting Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 81 (1985)).
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relevant.86  In other legal contexts, however, causation is the operative
issue under the substantive law.  Hence, in a lawsuit claiming that the
defendant’s drug caused the plaintiff’s diabetes, causation is at the
heart of the matter.87  As this summary suggests, then, G2i is a con-
cept endemic to applied science and might involve reasoning from
group data to diagnosis or from group data to etiology.  In the law,
sometimes only an inference of diagnosis is necessary, while some-
times an inference of causation is required.  The substantive law usu-
ally sets forth the necessary level of proof.  The problem occurs when
the language used, and the concepts involved, are muddled as scien-
tific evidence crosses these domain boundaries.  As the next section
documents, this is exactly what has occurred in the areas of medical
diagnosis and medical causation.  Thus, it should be imperative that
when G2i issues cross domain boundaries, everyone—i.e., judges, law-
yers, and scientists—should be clear on their meaning and relevance.
B. Some Historical Perspective
A search of the WestlawNext database indicates that the first time a
court used the term “differential etiology” in a published opinion was
in the 1995 case McCullock v. H.B. Fuller Co.88  This term, however,
appears to be an invention of the McCullock court, or perhaps of the
expert who appeared at trial.89  Differential etiology was apparently a
revision of the commonly used term “differential diagnosis,” the ac-
cepted methodology for identifying a patient’s disease or injury by
comparing her symptoms with the symptoms of similar diseases or in-
juries.  According to Stedman’s Medical Dictionary, differential diag-
nosis is defined as the “the determination of which of two or more
diseases with similar symptoms is the one from which the patient is
86. Cf. Yu-Wen Lu v. Unum Grp., No. 09–cv–03080 RMW, 2012 WL 44636, at *4 (N.D. Cal.
Jan. 9, 2012) (“The Plan defines ‘mental illness’ as ‘a psychiatric or psychological condition re-
gardless of cause such as schizophrenia, depression, manic depressive or bipolar illness, anxiety,
personality disorders and/or adjustment disorders or other conditions.’”).
87. See, e.g., Guinn v. AstraZeneca Pharm. LP, 602 F.3d 1245, 1254 (11th Cir. 2010) (“The
district court did not abuse its discretion by finding that [the expert’s] differential diagnosis was
unreliable under Daubert because she failed to adequately consider possible alternative causes
of [the plaintiff’s] weight gain and diabetes.”).
88. 61 F.3d 1038, 1043 (2d Cir. 1995).
89. The first mention of “differential etiology” in the opinion implies that the expert described
his methodology in these terms: “[The defendant] disputes that the method [Dr. David] Fagelson
used to come to his medical conclusion, ‘differential etiology,’ qualifies as scientific under
Daubert.” Id. at 1043.  Moreover, our searches of medical and scientific databases, including
popular websites such as Wikipedia, failed to identify any regular use of the term “differential
etiology” as a term of art.
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suffering by a systematic comparison and contrasting of the clinical
findings.”90
Prior to 1995, courts regularly employed the medical term “differ-
ential diagnosis” in their evaluations of proffered medical testimony.
Indeed, differential diagnosis was used as early as 1940 in its medical
sense to identify the plaintiff’s disease.91  However, in the 1980s, the
idea that differential diagnosis might be used to explain not just the
identification of the illness but also its cause began to creep into court
decisions.  In a 1982 case out of the Eastern District of New York, for
example, Judge George C. Pratt noted that the plaintiff’s expert had
relied on a differential diagnosis to “rule[ ] out other possible causes”
in support of his conclusion that the likelihood that the plaintiff’s “op-
tic neuritis was caused by the swine flu vaccine exceeds 90%.”92  The
court ultimately excluded this testimony, finding that it was based on
little more than temporal proximity between the vaccine and the onset
of symptoms.93  Through the 1980s, courts continued to employ the
term “differential diagnosis,” primarily to designate its medical sense,
but increasingly to also include the identification of the cause of some
illness.  This trend continued into the 1990s, and then exploded fol-
lowing the Court’s decision in Daubert in 1993.  This section traces
some of this history, or the etymology of, the term “differential
etiology.”
C. Inventing “Differential Etiology”
Although McCullock appears to be the first published case to use
the term differential etiology to distinguish it from the medical mean-
ing of differential diagnosis, the court paid it little attention.  The
court made no effort to define the term and, indeed, was likely en-
tirely unaware of the term’s significance.  The court stated that the
expert “based his opinion on a range of factors,” including “differen-
tial etiology,” but did nothing more than list them seriatim.94
90. STEDMAN’S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 531 (28th ed. 2006).
91. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co. of Hartford, Conn. v. Harmegnies, 110 F.2d 20, 26 (8th Cir.
1940).
92. Grill v. United States, 552 F. Supp. 505, 507 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
93. Id. at 510.
94. McCullock v. H.B. Fuller Co., 61 F.3d 1038, 1044 (2d Cir. 1995).  According to the McCul-
lock court:
[The expert] based his opinion on a range of factors, including his care and treatment of
McCullock; her medical history. . . ; pathological studies; review of Fuller’s MSDS; his
training and experience; use of a scientific analysis known as differential etiology
(which requires listing possible causes, then eliminating all causes but one); and refer-
ence to various scientific and medical treatises.
Id.
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Following McCullock, the term “differential etiology” began to ap-
pear more regularly in court decisions, often with perfunctory cita-
tions to McCullock itself.95  However, courts tended to use differential
etiology and differential diagnosis interchangeably.  For example, the
Fourth Circuit, in Westberry v. Gislaved Gummi AB,96 stated that
“[d]ifferential diagnosis, or differential etiology, is a standard scien-
tific technique of identifying the cause of a medical problem by elimi-
nating the likely causes until the most probable one is isolated.”97  The
court then went on to define differential diagnosis as a process of
identifying “the possible causes for the patient’s symptoms and then
eliminating each of these potential causes until reaching one that can-
not be ruled out.”98  Yet, the Westberry court cited a Third Circuit
case for support, which had defined the accepted medical meaning of
differential diagnosis, which involves determining “which of two or
more diseases with similar symptoms is the one from which the patient
is suffering.”99  In the same citation string, the Westberry court also
cited McCullock’s approval of differential etiology.  The Westberry
court, however, did not cite any medical or scientific literature for the
reliability and validity of differential etiology, presumably because
none exists.100  Instead, Westberry cited the Third Circuit case, which
had relied on Stedman’s Medical Dictionary to support the medical
sense of differential diagnosis.101  By confusing etiology with diagno-
sis, the court accepted the validity of the former because it equated it
with the latter.102
This confusion of terms between the medically accepted method of
differential diagnosis and the legally relevant issue of differential eti-
95. See, e.g., Zuchowicz v. United States, 140 F.3d 381, 385 (2d Cir. 1998) (“[Dr. Mathay’s]
conclusion was based on the temporal relationship between the overdose and the start of the
disease and the differential etiology method of excluding other possible causes.”); Berk v. St.
Vincent’s Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 380 F. Supp. 2d 334, 354 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (“[The medical expert]
applied a methodology termed ‘differential etiology’ . . . to rule out causes of the plaintiff’s
illnesses other than one traceable to the defendants in that case.”  (citations omitted)).
96. 178 F.3d 257 (1999).
97. Id. at 262.
98. Id. (emphasis added).
99. Kannankeril v. Terminix Int’l Inc., 128 F.3d 802, 807 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting STEDMAN’S
MEDICAL DICTIONARY 428 (25th ed. 1990)).
100. Other courts have also failed to cite any medical or scientific literature for the reliability
and validity of differential etiology. See, e.g., Golod v. La Roche, 964 F. Supp. 841, 858
(S.D.N.Y. 1997); Haggerty v. Upjohn Co., 950 F. Supp. 1160, 1165–67 (S.D. Fla. 1996).
101. Westberry, 178 F.3d at 262 (citing to Kannankeril, 128 F.3d at 807).
102. Id. at 263 (“Thus, we hold that a reliable differential diagnosis provides a valid founda-
tion for an expert opinion [on causation].”).
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ology plagues a multitude of judicial opinions.103  Increasingly, how-
ever, courts are emphasizing the point that medical diagnosis and
etiology are different concepts.  For example, in Hendrix v. Evenflo
Co.,104 the court noted that “[a]lthough the parties and other cases
often refer to this method as ‘differential diagnosis,’ throughout the
opinion we will use the more precise term ‘differential etiology.’”105
Many other cases have similarly begun to make clear the distinction
between medical diagnosis and etiology.106
103. Hardyman v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 243 F.3d 255, 260 (6th Cir. 2001) (“The Fourth
Circuit recently addressed the differential diagnosis methodology in making a Daubert determi-
nation, stating: ‘Differential diagnosis, or differential etiology, is a standard scientific technique
of identifying the cause of a medical problem by eliminating the likely causes until the most
probable one is isolated.’” (quoting Westberry, 178 F.3d at 262)); see also Cano v. Everest Miner-
als Corp., 362 F. Supp. 2d 814, 841 (W.D. Tex. 2005) (“Many cases involving issues of external
causation have involved witnesses who testify to having arrived at an opinion on cause through a
process of ruling out or eliminating other causes, a process frequently referred to by the courts
and witnesses as ‘differential diagnosis’ or ‘differential etiology’ . . . .  Not infrequently, this form
of testimony is implicitly or explicitly offered to satisfy the applicable burden of proof on causa-
tion.” (quoting FED. JUDICIAL CTR., REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 470 n.112
(2d ed. 2000)); Smith v. Wyeth-Ayerst Labs. Co., 278 F. Supp. 2d 684, 692 (W.D.N.C. 2003)
(“Differential diagnosis, or differential etiology, is a standard scientific technique of identifying
the cause of a medical problem by eliminating the likely causes until the most probable one is
isolated.” (quoting Westberry, 178 F.3d at 262)); Golod, 964 F. Supp. at 858 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)
(“Like the expert physician in McCullock, Drs. Barasch, Friedman and Oksman used a scientific
analysis known as differential etiology or differential diagnosis to rule out other possible causes
of Golod’s injuries, leaving Tegison as the most likely etiologic agent. This methodology is ac-
cepted in this Circuit and other jurisdictions.” (citations omitted)); Lytle v. Ford Motor Co., 696
N.E.2d 465, 476 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998) (“The intellectual and logical process of deductive reason-
ing that Peterson employed—which is formally known as differential diagnosis or differential
etiology—is frequently used by experts in many fields to determine whether a product that could
generally cause a type of injury was the cause in fact of a particular injury and is well recognized
as a legitimate and scientifically valid methodology.”); Boren v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry.
Co., 637 N.W.2d 910, 920 (Neb. Ct. App. 2002) (“Boren’s medical experts based their opinions
on what is known as differential diagnosis.  Differential diagnosis, or differential etiology, is a
standard scientific technique of identifying the cause of a medical problem by eliminating the
likely causes until the most probable one is isolated.” (citations omitted)).
For more examples of this confusion of terms, see Schultz v. Akzo Nobel Paints, LLC, 721
F.3d 426, 433 (7th Cir. 2013); Tingey v. Radionics, 193 F. App’x 747, 766–67 (10th Cir. 2006);
Quirin v. Lorillard Tobacco Co., No. 13 C 2633, 2014 WL 716162, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 25, 2014);
Zellars v. NexTech Ne., LLC, 895 F. Supp. 2d 734, 741–42 (E.D. Va. 2012); Wagoner v. Exxon
Mobil Corp., 813 F. Supp. 2d 771 (E.D. La. 2011); Pritchard v. Dow Agro Scis., 705 F. Supp. 2d
471, 479 (W.D. Penn. 2010); In re Fosamax Prods. Liab. Litig., 645 F. Supp. 2d 164, 178–79
(S.D.N.Y. 2009); King v. Burlington N. Santa Fe Ry. Co., 746 N.W.2d 383, 391 (Neb. Ct. App.
2008); San Francisco v. Wendy’s Int’l, Inc., 656 S.E.2d 485, 497 (W. Va. 2007).
104. Hendrix ex rel. G.P. v. Evenflo Co., 609 F.3d 1183 (11th Cir. 2010).
105. Id. at 1194 n.5.
106. See, e.g., S. States Coop., Inc. v. Melick Aquafeeds, Inc., 701 F. Supp. 2d 1348, 1358 n.5
(M.D. Ga. 2010) (“The Court believes that the process that Dr. Davis used is defined as ‘differ-
ential etiology.’  Differential diagnosis leads to the diagnosis of a patient’s condition, not neces-
sarily the cause of the condition.  In contrast, differential etiology is ‘a term used on occasion by
expert witnesses or courts to describe the investigation and reasoning that leads to the determi-
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Although courts might be starting to understand the difference be-
tween the two terms, they have not seriously considered how the un-
derlying methods and principles actually differ.107  Thus, while the
Hendrix court distinguished the two terms, it concluded summarily
that “the differential etiology method can provide a valid basis for
medical causation opinions.”108 Hendrix cited McClain v. Metabolife
International, Inc.109 for that proposition.  However, McClain never
analyzed the methodology of differential etiology; it merely distin-
guished it from the medical understanding of differential diagnosis.110
Indeed, the McClain court ruled against the plaintiff on the ground
that the general association between the claimed toxin and the plain-
tiff’s illness had not been demonstrated.111  The first step of any differ-
nation of external causation.” (citations omitted)); King v. Burlington N. Santa Fe Ry. Co., 762
N.W.2d 24, 49–50 (Neb. 2009) (“We pause here to note that courts, including this court, have not
always been careful to distinguish between differential diagnosis and differential etiology.  But
differential diagnosis refers to a physician’s ‘determination of which one of two or more diseases
or conditions a patient is suffering from, by systematically comparing and contrasting their
clinical findings.’  In contrast, etiology refers to determining the causes of a disease or disorder.”
(footnotes omitted)); Jones v. CSX Transp., Inc., 54 Va. Cir. 341, 341 (2001) (“They claim to have
used the concept of ‘differential diagnosis’ (more appropriately denoted ‘differential etiology’ as
diagnosis refers to a determination of the disease or condition and etiology to its cause).”).
107. In a trend worth noting, but which exceeds the scope of the present enterprise, courts
have increasingly considered, and sometimes required, the use of a differential etiology in non-
medical contexts.  In Safrani v. Werner Co., an engineering expert witness used differential etiol-
ogy to determine whether a design or manufacturing defect in the rivet of a six-foot aluminum
ladder caused the plaintiff’s fall and injuries.  No. 95 Civ. 1267(LBS), 1997 WL 729110, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 1997).  The court evaluated the sufficiency of the expert’s methodology, and
found that the expert had appropriately based his opinion on factors such as: (1) a review of the
ladder and accident site; (2) his interview of the plaintiff; and (3) his research in the common
failures of rivet joints. Id.  In Armeanu v. Bridgestone/Firestone North American Tire, LLC, the
court found that a tire analyst expert did not properly employ differential etiology in his causa-
tion analysis of the plaintiff’s tire failure, because he did not eliminate a statistically significant
number of potential causes.  No. CIV 05-619 JB/DJS, 2006 WL 4060665, at *18 (D.N.M. Sept. 26,
2006).  In Southern States Coop., Inc. v. Melick Aquafeeds, Inc., the court found that a fish nutri-
tion expert’s testimony was admissible, even though the opponent contended that the expert did
not properly employ differential etiology in his causation analysis.  476 F. App’x. 185, 188 (11th
Cir. 2012).  The court described “differential etiology” as “a process of elimination in which (1)
an expert compiles all possible causes of an injury, . . . and (2) he rules out each of the potential
causes ‘until reaching one that cannot be ruled out or determining which of those that cannot be
excluded is the most likely.’” Id. (citations omitted).  The court found that the expert suffi-
ciently evaluated each possible cause of the slowing of fish growth, and then ruled out each of
the potential causes until he determined that the changes in feed was the most likely cause. Id.
108. Hendrix, 609 F.3d at 1195.  It is worth noting that the Hendrix court went on to point out
that what it believed to be a generally valid method had to be shown to have been applied
reasonably to “the facts of this case.” Id.  Ultimately, however, the court affirmed the trial
court’s exclusion of the expert evidence on the basis that the plaintiff had failed to show general
causation, thus obviating any need for a differential etiology. Id.
109. 401 F.3d 1233 (11th Cir. 2005).
110. Id. at 1252.
111. Id. at 1253.
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ential etiology must be that the purported cause could have caused the
claimed illness.112  Only if the substance could cause the illness should
the claimant be able to prove that it did so in a particular case.
IV. TOWARD AN EPISTEMOLOGY OF “DIFFERENTIAL ETIOLOGY”
As is generally understood today, medical causation operates at the
two levels of generality that constitute the G2i of all applied science.
In such cases, the “G” of G2i is typically referred to as “general causa-
tion.”  In court, however, the question also arises as to whether a par-
ticular case is an instance of some general phenomenon.113  This is the
“i” of G2i.  In medical causation cases, courts refer to this as “specific
causation.”  Hence, general and specific causation are subcategories of
G2i.  In many scientific evidence contexts, of course, the legal issue is
not causation; it might only be association (as with predictions of vio-
lence) or descriptive (as with psychiatric diagnoses, such as schizo-
phrenia or bipolar disorder).114  G2i, then, describes the general
problem of reasoning from group data to an individual case, and med-
ical causation (general and specific) is one aspect of it.
A. Describing Differential Etiology
In the context of medical causation, the concepts of general and
specific causation constitute the two component parts of the necessary
112. See infra notes 115–119 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., Clausen v. M/V New
Carissa, 339 F.3d 1049, 1057–58 (9th Cir. 2003); Black v. Food Lion, Inc., 171 F.3d 308, 314 (5th
Cir. 1999).
113. In some cases, especially involving constitutional litigation, the only relevant issue will be
the G of G2i.  For example, in First Amendment cases involving legislative restrictions on violent
video games, the issue concerned whether, as a general matter, the legislature’s claim that such
games led to increased violence in children was supported by research.  There was no corre-
sponding issue regarding any individual cases.  The case was resolved at the general level of the
research. See Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2739 (2011) (dismissing studies
purporting to indicate a connection between exposure to violent video games and harmful ef-
fects on children because they merely “show at best some correlation between exposure to vio-
lent entertainment and minuscule real-world effects, such as children’s feeling more aggressive
or making louder noises in the few minutes after playing a violent game than after playing a
nonviolent game”).
114. Interestingly, a WestlawNext search of all federal cases for courts’ use of these terms
prior to Daubert identified only seventeen cases in which these terms were used substantively,
and three of these were Judge Weinstein’s opinions.  The search term used was “general /5 causa-
tion & specific /5 causation,” with a date limitation of prior to June 28, 1993.  The three Judge
Weinstein opinions were In re “Agent Orange” Product Liability Litigation, 611 F. Supp. 1396,
1408 (E.D.N.Y. 1985); In re “Agent Orange” Product Liability Litigation, 597 F. Supp. 740,
782–83 (E.D.N.Y. 1984); and In re “Agent Orange” Product Liability Litigation, 100 F.R.D. 718,
724 (E.D.N.Y. 1983).
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proof.115  General causation is demonstrated by sufficient empirical
evidence to prove that the substance in question can cause the illness
in question.  Specific causation is demonstrated by sufficient empirical
evidence to prove that the substance in question did cause the illness
in question.  Differential etiology is a methodology that courts have
identified as a way to prove specific causation.  Unfortunately, differ-
ential etiology is a legal term of art, not a scientific method.116  Not
surprisingly, then, it is well described but poorly defined.117
Courts and commentators have repeatedly described the basic con-
cept behind differential etiology.  As an initial matter, as noted above,
the putative cause of the illness must be “ruled in” by sufficient proof;
differential etiology is the process of ruling out other possible causes.
In the Federal Judicial Center’s Reference Manual on Scientific Evi-
dence, Michael Green and colleagues described the term as follows:
In a differential etiology, an expert first determines other known
causes of the disease in question and then attempts to ascertain
whether those competing causes can be “ruled out” as a cause of
plaintiff’s disease . . . .  By ruling out (or ruling in) the possibility of
other causes, the probability that a given agent was the cause of an
individual’s disease can be refined.118
As Green and colleagues observe, “the logic” of this methodology
“is sound”: “[e]liminating other known and competing causes in-
creases the probability that a given individual’s disease was caused by
exposure to the agent.”119  However, therein lies the problem.  Differ-
ential etiology is ostensibly a scientific methodology, but one not de-
veloped by, or even recognized by, physicians or scientists.  As
described, it is entirely logical, but has no scientific methods or princi-
ples underlying it.  It is a legal invention and, as such, has analytical
heft, but it is entirely bereft of empirical grounding.  Courts and com-
mentators have so far merely described the logic of differential etiol-
ogy; they have yet to define what that methodology is.
115. See Smith v. Gen. Motors Corp., 376 F. Supp. 2d 664, 667 (W.D. Va. 2005) (quoting JACK
B. WEINSTEIN ET AL., WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 702.06 (2d ed. 2014) (“The issue of
causation can be viewed in two parts, general causation and specific causation.”)).
116. FED. JUDICIAL CTR., REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 691 (3d ed. 2011)
[hereinafter SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE] (“[D]ifferential etiology is a legal invention not used by
physicians.”).
117. See generally Joseph Sanders & Julie Machal-Fulks, The Admissibility of Differential Di-
agnosis Testimony To Prove Causation in Toxic Tort Cases: The Interplay of Adjective and Sub-
stantive Law, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 2001, at 107.
118. SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, supra note 116, at 617–18.
119. Id. at 617.
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B. Toward a Definition of Differential Etiology
Differential etiology is a reasoning process that involves a multitude
of factors, few of which are easily quantified.  It is well recognized that
an expert must first “rule in” the purported cause of the illness or
condition.120  However, in practice, the purported general cause might
be strongly associated with the condition or weakly associated with
the condition.  Hence, an expert offering an opinion regarding a spe-
cific case must first consider the strength of the evidence for the gen-
eral proposition being applied in the case.  If the claim is that
substance X caused the plaintiff’s condition Y, the initial inquiry must
concern the strength of the relationship between X and Y as a general
proposition.  For example, both second-hand smoke and first-hand
smoke are associated with lung cancer, but the strength of the rela-
tionship generally is much stronger for the latter than it is for the for-
mer.  The inquiry regarding the strength of the relationship will
depend on many factors, including, among other things, the statistical
strength of any claims and the quality of the methods used in the re-
search.  Additionally, the general model must consider the strength of
the evidence for alternative possible causes of Y and the strength of
their respective relationships (and possibly interactions with other fac-
tors).  Again, the quality of the research and the different methodolo-
gies employed will make comparisons difficult.  Complicating matters
further regarding identification of potential causes of condition Y are
the myriad of possible causes that have not been studied, or have not
been studied adequately.  Hence, determining the contours of the gen-
eral model is a dicey affair in itself, because it requires combining dis-
parate research results and discounting those results by an unknown
factor associated with additional variables not yet studied.  And this is
just the first part of the necessary analysis if the expert wants to give
an opinion about an individual case.
120. In Cavallo v. Star Enterprise, the trial judge observed as follows:
The process of differential diagnosis is undoubtedly important to the question of “spe-
cific causation.”  If other possible causes of an injury cannot be ruled out, or at least the
probability of their contribution to causation minimized, then the “more likely than
not” threshold for proving causation may not be met.  But, it is also important to recog-
nize that a fundamental assumption underlying this method is that the final, suspected
“cause” remaining after this process of elimination must actually be capable of causing
the injury.  That is, the expert must “rule in” the suspected cause as well as “rule out”
other possible causes.  And, of course, expert opinion on this issue of “general causa-
tion” must be derived from a scientifically valid methodology.
892 F. Supp. 756, 771 (E.D. Va. 1995), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 100 F.3d 1150, 1159 (4th Cir.
1996).
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The second part of the analysis—the specific application of general
propositions that are themselves supported by adequate research—
requires two abilities, neither of which is clearly within most scientists’
skill sets.  The first, and perhaps less problematic, is that of forensic
investigator.  Almost no matter what the empirical relationship,
whether medical or psychological, exposure or dosage levels will be
relevant to the diagnosis.  The first principle of toxicology is that “the
dose makes the poison,” because any substance in sufficient quantities
could injure or kill someone.  Similarly, in a wide variety of psycholog-
ical contexts, the exposure or dose will be the poison.  For instance,
the degree of trauma affects diagnostic categorization between PTSD
and adjustment disorder, the level of anxiety affects eyewitness identi-
fications, the amount of sleep deprivation affects false confession
rates, and so on.  The expert testifying to specific causation must de-
termine exposure and dosage levels for the suspected cause (i.e., the
source suspected by the client), as well as for all other known or possi-
ble causes.  This task is difficult enough alone, but is made enormously
complicated by the significant potential for recall bias, given that the
litigation will be profoundly affected by what is recalled.
The second skill set that is needed has not yet been invented or
even described with precision.  Somehow, the diagnostician must com-
bine the surfeit of information concerning the multitude of factors
that make up the general model, then combine it with the case history
information known or suspected about the individual, and offer an
opinion with some level of confidence that substance or experience X
was the likely cause of condition Y.  In practice, this opinion is usually
stated as follows: “Within a reasonable degree of medical/psychologi-
cal certainty, it is my opinion that X caused [a particular case of] Y.”
This expression has no empirical meaning and is simply a mantra re-
peated by experts for purposes of legal decision makers who similarly
have no idea what it means.121  But even less extreme versions of this
statement—such as, “It is more likely true than not that this case is an
instance of some general phenomenon”—are objectionable.  Just how,
for instance, would an eyewitness researcher determine that a witness
was more likely than not inaccurate when the witness made a cross-
racial identification of the defendant after seeing the unarmed perpe-
trator for five minutes under a streetlight from an unobstructed view
twenty feet away from the crime?  There are no data that would sup-
port psychologists’ ability to make such statements, however modest
121. See generally Jeff L. Lewin, The Genesis and Evolution of Legal Uncertainty About “Rea-
sonable Medical Certainty,” 57 MD. L. REV. 380 (1998); Robert D. Miller, Reasonable Medical
Certainty: A Rose by Any Other Name, 34 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 273, 278 (2006).
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or innocuous they may appear.  Experts’ case-specific conclusions ap-
pear to be based largely on an admixture of an unknown combination
of knowledge of the subject, experience over the years, commitment
to the client or cause, intuition, and blind faith.
V. CONCLUSION
In this Article, we have considered many inconsistencies and ironies
that lie along the border of law and science.  In 1993, the Supreme
Court adopted a scientific perspective in interpreting Federal Rule of
Evidence 702, requiring judges to examine the methods and principles
underlying proffered expert opinions.  This mandate calls for judges,
and the lawyers who practice before them, to be scientifically literate.
Yet, even twenty years after Daubert brought the scientific revolution
to the courtroom, lawyers and judges continue to struggle with the
complexities of the methods and mathematics of science.  This has
made translating scientific findings into legal decisions a challenging
affair.
Translating science for courtroom use is made inherently difficult
because of a basic tension that exists between how scientists collect
data about the world and how courts use those data.  Scientists study
phenomena with the goal of generalizing their results.  In the court-
room, these phenomena have relevance to the extent that they inform
about a particular case.  Thus, scientists primarily study groups in or-
der to identify generalizable phenomena, whereas courts are primarily
interested in determining whether an individual case is an instance of
some general phenomenon.  This is the problem of G2i reasoning.
In the context of medical causation, G2i translation challenges have
been particularly acute.  In the practice of medicine, G2i is accom-
plished through the well-accepted methodology of differential diagno-
sis.  Using this method, physicians use general data to identify what
illness a person suffers from by ruling out as many alternatives as pos-
sible.  In the courtroom, however, diagnosis of an illness is not ordina-
rily the operative question, but rather the identification of its etiology.
Initially, in the 1980s, courts used the term differential diagnosis to
mean both identification of illness and its etiology.  However, this is
not the medical or scientific meaning of the term.  Beginning in 1995,
a new term arose—differential etiology—to describe the necessary
methodology for identifying cause.  However, differential etiology is a
term invented by courts and was not used, or defined, by scientists.
Indeed, though the logic of ruling out alternative causes is sound,
courts and commentators have yet to define just how this method
works.  More problematic, scientists and statisticians have yet to do so
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either.  We offer a few tentative ideas on what such a method might
look like, but much more needs to be done.
It is perhaps ironic that Daubert called upon courts to increase their
scientific literacy, a call that has still gone largely unheeded.  Yet, in
the context of medical causation, courts have invented a methodol-
ogy—differential etiology—that purports to resolve the G2i problem.
Unfortunately, this method has only so far been described; it has not
been defined with any precision.  For now, it remains a highly ambigu-
ous idea, sound in principle, but profoundly underdefined.  Ulti-
mately, however, courts are unlikely to have the wherewithal to do
better in this regard than they have done so far.  Courts will need the
help of the scientific community if they are ever to do more than sim-
ply muddle through the G2i problem.
